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Whilst Corporate Social Responsibility is now part and parcel of many 
multinational mining operations, and a ‘sustainable mining’ narrative a 
fundamental part of their public persona, companies still struggle to provide 
secure, long-term livelihoods for either locals or the swathe of migrants mining 
attracts. Minimal opportunities in the formal sector leave migrants in particular 
engaging in informal and illegal activities that offer poor livelihood security. In 
this paper we examine these activities in Northern Zambia’s emerald mines to 
highlight some of the issues and barriers to sustainable development that exist 
across mining zones. We conclude that livelihood choices are not augmented 
by a so-called ‘sustainable mining’ approach that fails to engage all sectors of 
the population. We show the numerous challenges faced by migrants in this 
part of Zambia to accentuate the factors that need to be addressed before 
favourable environments for fostering sustainable mining might be achieved. 
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Introduction 
“We are constantly punishing ourselves in search of a good life”  
(Mining migrant and charcoal burner, Kafubu 2012). 
 
The convoluted relationship between mining, local-level development and the use and 
preservation of natural resources, encapsulated by the ‘sustainable mining’ narrative, 
continues to be paramount in debates concerning extractive industry (e.g. Benson and Kirsch 
2010; Hendrix 2006; Kirsch 2010). Central to these debates is the reality that ‘sustainable 
mining’ is defeated by the intrinsic character of the industry itself as short-term, capital-
intensive, dependent on a specialist, mobile workforce, vulnerable to market fluctuations and 
frequently interrupted by local grievances (Kirsch 2010). Yet, in spite of practical limitations, 
mining companies continue to adopt an approach that claims to contribute to local social and 
environmental ‘sustainability’ thus fulfilling increasing expectations on the sector to deliver 
as paragons of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).  
  
The concept of ‘sustainable mining’ draws on the Brundtland definition of sustainable 
development1 to promote the industry’s actors as agents of ‘best practice’ in economic, 
social, environmental and governance spheres (MMSD 2002).2 Mining giants such as Rio 
Tinto, Barrick Gold and Anglo American underline CSR strategies with a ‘sustainability’ 
narrative. For BHP Billiton (2015), for example: ‘Sustainability is core to our strategy, 
ensuring we integrate health, safety, environmental, social and economic factors into our 
decision-making.’, whilst Rio Tinto (2015) assert that: ‘Because we recognise that we have a 
responsibility to all our stakeholders and to the wider world, our commitment to sustainable 
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development is integrated into everything we do’. By actively fostering perceptions of 
‘sustainable mining’, companies present themselves as constructive contributors to 
development, nurturing positive relations with their host governments and mitigating 
antagonism with local communities through community development projects. The activation 
of ‘sustainable mining’ at the local level thus implies action in socioeconomic (education, 
health, training) and environmental (promoting the efficient use of natural resources and 
preventing land degradation) spheres to broaden livelihood opportunities for those affected 
by the industry. 
 
Whilst some academics argue that recent reforms to extractive industry companies’ modus 
operandi foster positive contributions to socioeconomic development (e.g. Ite 2007), others 
identify ‘sustainable mining’ as ‘a slogan of little practical value to the public-policy makers’ 
(Hendrix 2006: 52), or an oxymoronic concept where the promise of sustainability hides 
symptoms of social, economic and environmental devastation (e.g. Benson and Kirsch 2010; 
Frynas 2005; Gilberthorpe and Banks 2012; Trebeck 2008).  
 
In this paper we take a more nuanced approach to ‘sustainable mining’ to show how 
corporate engagement might be improved in the pursuit of a CSR agenda. Our argument is 
framed by an acknowledgement of the discord between the characteristics peculiar to 
‘sustainable development’ and those peculiar to mining. Drawing on the Brundtland 
definition of ‘sustainability’ and the Western model of ‘development’ we identify these 
characteristics as inclusive, linear, progressive, transformative, and target-driven. 
Transposing these characteristics onto mining zones is, we argue, like trying to fit a square 
peg into a round hole. The approach needs to be chiselled and modified to fit both the context 
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and the peculiarities of the industry itself. Corporate ambitions of ‘sustainable mining’ 
remain limited by this lack of tailoring. 
 
To illustrate this we focus on the role that the thriving migrant population mining typically 
attracts plays in local socioeconomic activity. By focussing on this sector of the population 
we show how industry practitioners continually struggle to engage with the complexity of the 
aspirations and grievances of the diverse and thriving populations that mining generates. We 
argue that a ‘sustainable mining’ approach to CSR must engage all sectors of the population. 
This engagement must be individual and inclusive to provide the tools for a sustainable 
lifestyle that can improve livelihoods on an immediate and subsequently long-term basis.   
 
The opportunities for income generation in mining zones and subsequent potential for 
sustainable development have been widely debated (e.g. Buxton 2013; Grätz 2009; 
Heemskerk 2002; Hilson 2010; Hilson and Garforth 2012; Hilson and Potter 2005; Lungu 
and Shikwe 2006; Nyame, Grant and Yakovleva 2009; Tschakert 2009; Werthmann 2009). 
On the one hand, researchers identify key outcomes such as reducing levels of youth 
unemployment and facilitating economic booms (e.g. Hilson and Osei 2014; Nyame and 
Grant, 2014; Wilson 2012), whilst others identify socioeconomic marginalisation and 
subsequent economic instability (e.g. Gilberthorpe and Banks 2012; Maunamoha, Maharaj 
and Preston-Whyte 2010).   
 
As recent research suggests, the majority of migrants moving to mining zones come in search 
of formal employment with commercial mine operators (Gyan-Baffour 2003; Hilson and 
Garforth 2012; Hinton 2011). Whilst a minority succeed in this endeavour, many more do not 
for reasons discussed widely in the literature (e.g. Maunamoha et al 2010; Nyame et al 2009) 
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and in more detail below. With few other options available, migrants engage in the numerous 
informal opportunities for income generation that mining zones offer (where the resource is 
so-called ‘lootable’), including unlicensed artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) and the 
theft of minerals from concessions established by commercial mines (Buxton 2013).  Other 
satellite activities have been documented to frequently mushroom around this informal sector, 
with small businesses catering to the needs of migrant mining populations and branching out 
to exploit other readily available resources, such as fisheries and timber. This collection of 
alternative approaches to generating livelihood incomes constitutes a vibrant informal sector 
operating on the periphery of commercial mining operations.  
 
In this paper we explore ‘sustainable mining’ in the Kafubu emerald mines of Northern 
Zambia, an area undergoing large-scale, open-pit mining by two companies operating within 
a sustainable mining framework3. Kafubu has attracted a vast number of individuals who 
come in search of opportunities to share in its wealth (Lungu and Shikwe 2006). We explore 
the expectations originally held by these migrants and the range of informal activities they 
fall into when their ambitious expectations are not met. We examine the informal economy 
they have assembled to assess the effects of these activities on livelihood security, the local 
economy and social dynamics and on natural resource availability. We further examine how 
corporate activities founded on sustainable approaches to natural resource use engage with 
the host of informal activities that spring up around mining sites, and the corporate capacity 
to engage with the migrants living and working outside of formally-recognised communities 
(Gyan-Baffour 2003; Hilson and Garforth 2012; Hinton 2011).  
 
Our findings show that the informal migrant economy is a defining driver of local economic 
activity, underpinning social change and determining the dynamics of local resource use and 
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availability. As such, we argue, it is critical that mining companies recognise the informal 
economy as both a primary source of minerals arriving onto the market and a fundamental 
determinant of natural resource availability around mining sites when designing and 
implementing CSR initiatives. Only through engagement with this informal sector can secure 
livelihoods4 for all sectors of the population affected by their operations be achieved.  
 
We postulate that this might be achieved through CSR programmes that go beyond 
investments in infrastructure and services for established villages. We draw on our findings to 
highlight lessons for CSR initiatives to improve not only their approach to infrastructural 
development and service provision, but also their engagement with the informal sector 
populated by the migrants their operations attract.  
 
We begin with an outline of the methods used and the study area, followed by an examination 
of the data and consideration of our findings to contribute to the ‘sustainable mining’ debate. 
Finally, we provide recommendations and ‘lessons learned’ with the aim of contributing to 
CSR policy in mining zones.  
 
Methods and Study Area 
Methods   
Research was funded by The World Land Trust (WLT) on behalf of Gemfields Resources 
PLC (Gemfields from herein), a relatively new British-based mining company. Gemfields’ 
glossy marketing campaign, featuring global ambassador Mila Kunis, presents the company 
as ‘the world’s leading supplier of responsibly sourced coloured gemstones’ (Gemfields 
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2015). Funding was for an anthropological study (Gilberthorpe, Agol and Gegg 2012) 
highlighting key social issues in the area initiated by the company’s ambition to develop a 
CSR programme. As a result of our findings and recommendations, and that of a lateral 
ecological study, the company established a dedicated CSR branch and budget. There were 
no restrictions on the fieldwork or obligations to either the company (Gemfields) or the NGO 
(WLT) and we retained ownership of raw data throughout.  
 
Research was conducted between April and September 2012 within and around Northern 
Zambia’s Kafubu emerald fields in Lufwanyama District, Copperbelt Province. The fields, 
formally designated as the ‘Ndola Rural Emerald Restricted Area’, are currently undergoing 
commercial mining by Gemfields and a second Senegalese private mining company, Grizzly 
Mining Ltd (Grizzly from herein). 
 
Fieldwork was conducted within Gemfields’ Kagem mine and Grizzly’s Kamakanga mine, 
migrant camps within the restricted emerald fields, Pirala village, which is the only village 
within the restricted area, and three further sample villages – Kapila, Kandole, and Nkana – 
each located within 10-25 kilometres of the emerald fields’ borders. After an initial desk-
based literature review, data were collected using a mixed methods approach. A general 
ethnographic study, combining participant observation, conversation, semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups, was carried out to identify livelihood activities, natural resource 
use, political and administrative structures and interactions across the broader Lufwanyama 
District. From this study we identified expectations and perceptions of development, 
vulnerable actors and potential sources of conflict.5 
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We conducted a rapid socioeconomic assessment of a random sample of 49 migrants within 
and around the emerald fields6, to identify age and gender populations, and levels of income, 
education and employment. We also conducted research with local political representatives, 
security forces, expatriate corporate personnel and local mine employees. Ethical clearance 
was granted by the International Ethics Committee at the University of East Anglia.  
 
Zambia’s Emerald Mines 
Zambia’s Copperbelt has a long history of mining, stemming from the extraction of copper in 
the late 1890s (see Fraser 2010). The copper industry has been instrumental in Zambia’s 
economic development and long periods of good governance have ensured its relative 
stability (detail in Craig 2002; Ferguson 1999; Fraser 2010). With global copper prices 
currently in a lull, the country is moving to diversify its economic base through agriculture, 
tourism and emerald mining (Larmer 2010). 
 
Whilst emeralds were initially ‘discovered’ in the Kafubu area in 1928, commercial 
excavation did not begin in earnest until the 1940s.7 By the 1970s, Kafubu was a significant 
site for emerald mining, attracting a swathe of hopeful miners (Seifert, Žáček, Vrána, Pecina, 
Zachariáš and Zwaan 2004). In 1985 the Zambian Government declared much of Kafubu a 
restricted area, renaming it ‘Ndola Rural Emerald Restricted Area’ (NRERA) and officially 
limiting access to those with mining licenses and their associates. The local population was 
relocated and approximately 170 square kilometres demarcated into more than 520 mining 
concessions. Licence owners range from the Zambian Government and private companies to 
individual investors from both inside and outside the immediate vicinity. Of the original 
licenses, less than ten are currently in successful production.   
9 
 
 
The two main emerald mines in the NRERA, Kagem and Kamakanga, are small compared to 
the copper mines the region is known for. Nonetheless, at 41 square kilometres Kagem is the 
largest emerald mine in the world, with an open-pit measuring approximately 105 metres 
deep and 900 metres long (Gemfields 2015). The area supplies approximately 20% of the 
world’s emerald production, estimated to be worth between US$100 and 200 million 
(Behling and Wilson 2010; Gemfields 2015).  
 
Zambia’s Ministry of Mines and the Environmental Council manage the mining industry 
through a number of regulatory frameworks such as the Mines and Minerals Regulations Act, 
which covers a range of sociocultural (preserving cultural heritage and historical sites), 
economic (acquiring mining rights through licensing, mine closure), and environmental 
(surface excavations and air, soil and water pollution) issues. These regulations are, however, 
difficult to enforce outside of the formal mining sector, mainly due to a lack of resources (cf. 
Nyame et al. 2009). Consequently the monitoring of ASM, logging, pollution and poaching 
are weak and the area surrounding Kafubu is largely neglected by the various levels of 
governance. Local chiefs deal with grievances, conflict and property issues, whilst Gemfields 
and Grizzly take on a pseudo-government role by investing in infrastructural development. 
CSR Initiatives 
Both the corporations discussed in this paper present themselves as practitioners of 
responsible mining with a clear CSR agenda8.  Both have initiated a number of CSR projects 
across the region. Gemfields’ have invested in several farming co-operatives, whilst their 
two-year investment strategy (January 2014-2016) will see US$2 million invested into the 
villages outside the NRERA through a number of initiatives, including the upgrading of a 
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local clinic to a hospital, a new higher secondary school, a tree nursery (in collaboration with 
the Forestry Department), road upgrades, sports equipment in schools and improved support 
for local farmers in agri-businesses (ZMM 2015). Grizzly’s initiatives include road and 
bridge maintenance, healthcare and the building of two schools in Lufwanyama District 
including the only school within the NRERA (see Grizzly 2015). 
Kafubu 
Kafubu is home to the Lamba ethnic group who reside in approximately 34 villages across 
Lufwanyama District. Individuals from other ethnic groups, including Tonga, Luvele, 
Bemba, Lunda, Kaonde and Nyaja, also live in the area, having migrated to pursue 
employment in the Copperbelt mines or fulfil marriage commitments in the Kafubu area 
(Grätz 2009; Werthmann 2009). Many have strong ancestral links with the Lamba, especially 
the Tonga and Luvele, and are well integrated into local communities.  
 
Pirala, an informal settlement and trading hub with a population of approximately 250 
people, is the only village within the NRERA. Pirala is predominantly inhabited by migrants 
from other mining zones across the Copperbelt as well as individuals from, inter alia, 
Northwestern Province, Senegal and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The settlement has 
mushroomed around the trading centre of Pirala market, which caters for the diverse needs 
generated by Kafubu’s informal mining sector. Illegally erected within the NRERA, Pirala 
bears no formal recognition by regional government and does not have access to state 
services such as schools, transportation, water and electricity infrastructure, relying instead 
on what has been established by Gemfields and Grizzly.  
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The NRERA overlaps two local chiefdoms, the political institution that remains distinctly at 
the core of social organisation in Northern Zambia. Although Kafubu’s land was nationalised 
and labelled ‘restricted’ in 1985, traditional structures of customary land ownership remain 
influential and land tenure is still administered by local chiefs. Two chiefs govern Kafubu 
and the surrounding area in partnership with the local government. They grant rights over 
customary land, maintain peace and order, assist local community members and promote 
development. Both chiefs support mining activities and advocate a mineral-driven 
development through provision of employment and improved social services and amenities.  
 
Access to healthcare, education, transport and telecommunication services remain poor. One 
health clinic serves approximately 6,500 people. There are no public transport services and 
the nearest urban centres can only be reached by unsealed roads in private vehicles, which are 
costly and minimal. Power supplies are limited and only a few establishments, such as the 
company headquarters, have electricity.   
 
There is one private school, owned and financed by Grizzly, providing basic primary 
education within the NRERA and several state-run primary schools outside the emerald 
fields. The quality of education is poor and few children continue to secondary and post-
secondary levels. It is against this backdrop of low-level education, high levels of non-kin 
migration, poor service provision and restricted access to land that we conducted our 
fieldwork and on which the below findings are based.   
Findings  
Whilst migration into Kafubu has historically followed the traditions of kin-based marriage, 
obligation and exchange, our findings show that it has intensified over the last decade as a 
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result of incentives to engage in the economic activities mining provides. Approximately 
4,000 migrants currently reside within the NRERA (excluding formal mine employees). 
These migrants are engaged in the informal sector, with informal mining being the 
predominant livelihood activity, followed by charcoal burning, then small businesses. This 
wave of overwhelmingly male migrants is partly due to Kafubu’s proximity to the Copperbelt 
mines, with 76% of our sample migrating from other mining zones in the Copperbelt. 
Typically, these mining migrants have no kinship ties to the Kafubu area. 
 
Migrants reside in makeshift accommodation (mostly tents) in woodland within the NRERA, 
have family members in other parts of the country or continent and intend to return to them in 
the near future. Whilst a small number (particularly those with experience from working in 
other mines) have secured employment at the mines, or practice farming on land acquired 
from local chiefs outside the NRERA, the majority engage in the informal sector, which 
includes informal ASM, illegal mining, charcoal production and trading. We discuss each of 
these activities in turn below.  
 
The Formal Sector 
Employment with mining companies  
Mining companies are the main source of formal employment in and around Kafubu, hiring a 
range of people from unskilled labourers for chiselling and cleaning to engineers, surveyors, 
geologists, drivers, security officers and administrators. Approximately 800 migrants are 
employed on a contractual basis by Gemfields (approx. 500) and Grizzly (approx. 300). Mine 
employees enjoy regular incomes, catering, free healthcare and onsite accommodation 
facilities.  
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The type of employment individuals acquire depends on their level of education and skills. 
Entry into the formal mining sector requires qualifications beyond primary level, which limits 
opportunities for locals and many migrants amongst whom education levels are low. Our 
assessment of households from Pirala and Kapila recorded that the majority of adults 
(approximately 70%) did not progress beyond basic primary education. Obstacles such as 
school fees, inadequate resources (text books, uniforms, desks), household labour demands 
and a lack of transport services further affect the quality of education and student retention 
across Lufwanyama.  
 
Notably, the majority of senior positions are held by expatriates, whilst those holding skilled 
positions are part of the mobile workforce characteristic of mining. Of the Zambians 
employed by Gemfields, for example, approximately 25% are locals originating from 
Lufwanyama. The rest are from towns in the wider Copperbelt region and have permanent 
homes in larger cities. As such, cash generated in the formal sector is removed from the local 
economy, often in the form of remittances dispatched to urban centres, rather than stimulating 
a localised form of economic development. 
 
Risks in the formal sector: 
At the individual level the formal sector appears to offer greater livelihood security than the 
informal sector, but there are risks. First, the short-term and volatile nature of mining means 
jobs are temporary, posing particular risk for the non-specialised and non-skilled sector of the 
workforce. When mining operations cease, local (unskilled) employees do not become part of 
the otherwise mobile (skilled) workforce. Second, recruitment processes are poor. Informants 
stated that information about job openings was only available in newspapers and through 
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professional networks, to which people within the NRERA have limited access. Whilst the 
government advocates local employment, the local chiefs stated that not enough locals are 
employed by the large mines. Third, there is a high level of dismissal. Employees stated that 
suspicions run high within the corporations; association with illegal miners is strictly 
forbidden and emerald theft (or suspicion thereof) carries immediate dismissal. The formal 
sector thus provides minimal opportunities for locals and migrants and goes little way to 
contributing to economic development, and thus ‘sustainable mining’, across the region.  
 
The Informal Sector  
Our findings revealed that the NRERA incorporates a vibrant informal sector comprising a 
varied collection of activities. Whilst these are the predominant source of income for the 
thousands of migrants failing to secure employment at the Kamakanga or Kagem pits, they 
are not exclusively practiced by migrants. The restricted nature of the NRERA zone, which 
overrides traditional chiefdom governance to exclude individual rights to tenure and resource 
use, automatically defines all residency and activities as de facto informal when practiced by 
those outside of salaried employment by a mining firm. The portfolio of informal activities 
practiced by migrants ranges from increasingly audacious forms of unauthorised mining to 
setting up businesses that cater to the mining community and draw on other locally available 
natural resources, such as charcoal.  
Informal mining 
Because emeralds are so-called lootable resources of value to an external market, the Kafubu 
fields facilitate illegal mining activity. The informal mining sector includes informal ASM 
and the illegal mining of gemstones from pits owned by commercial companies. Many 
migrants and locals across Kafubu engage in ASM. Whilst some register excavation activities 
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under small mining concessions, most pits are operated informally with no licence. Because 
ASM requires a level of economic stability to purchase operating equipment and apply for 
and purchase a mineral exploitation licence, those operating informally do so with 
unsophisticated excavation tools and water pumps (see also Siegel and Veiga 2010). During 
our interviews, illegal miners stressed they are unable to afford the equipment needed for 
mining, mainly because they do not have access to credit facilities such as loans. They further 
stated that ASM work is tedious with low success rates. As such, locals mostly combine 
ASM with other formally-recognised activities on registered land whilst migrants engage in 
other illegal activities such as stealing from established pits and charcoal burning.  
 
Many migrants living within the NRERA exploit the opportunities unearthed by Grizzly and 
Gemfields’ excavations. These ‘miners’, frequently labelled as illegals by mining companies 
and locals alike, organise themselves into groups, sometimes of more than 50, to trespass 
onto corporate mining concessions and steal excavated material from industrial dump sites.  
 
Gemfields estimate a loss of approximately one-fifth of potential revenue to theft at the 
Kagem pit (Bloomberg Business 2015). Stringent security measures including electric 
fencing, 24-hour armed security guards and guard dogs have been deployed to impede this 
loss. Encounters between illegals and security personnel are common, with trespassers being 
apprehended on a weekly basis.  
 
Illegally mined emeralds are usually sold to urban merchants via travelling middlemen, 
known as “Go-Comes”. Go-Comes play an important role in the market chain, identifying 
buyers and sellers, negotiating prices and establishing informal agreements. Occasionally 
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they establish contractual agreements with long-term ASM workers and illegals in which a 
stipend is supplied.   
Charcoal production 
Charcoal production is the most significant livelihood income for migrants living within the 
NRERA woodlands. Rudimentary kilns erected in the Kafubu woods produce up to 15 bags 
of charcoal weighing approximately 50kg, with a single bag yielding up to US$4.00. 
Charcoal is a highly valued resource across Kafubu. It is the primary source of power for 
cooking and heating houses, restaurants, institutions (e.g. hospitals and schools) and open 
market places. It is thus a reliable source of income for migrants struggling to make a living 
from ASM or illegal mining. Bags of charcoal are frequently displayed for sale on the 
roadside within the NRERA and it is common to see men transporting bags by bicycle on the 
long journey to urban centres.  
 
Whilst charcoal burning is regulated by the Forest Department, with individuals being 
required to obtain a seasonal permit for burning and selling charcoal, the activity is difficult 
to monitor. Because charcoal burners have no land title deeds due to the emerald fields’ 
restricted status, they are not legally entitled to obtain licences. For locals living in the 
villages around Kafubu, the activity may complement farming but it is not a principal source 
of livelihood income. Many migrants complement night-time raids on the Kagem and 
Kamakanga pits with charcoal production during the day.  
Trading and small businesses  
The growth of small business centres operated by migrant traders to cater for the informal 
mining sector is a typical accompaniment to mining (Hilson 2010; Hinton, Veiga, Veiga, and 
Tadeu 2003).9 Pirala typifies this case, having sprung up in proximity to the Kamakanga mine 
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despite the government restrictions placed on tenure within the NRERA. Pirala serves as both 
a hub for housing and business activities, all of which are, by nature, informal in their 
deliberate evasion of the NRERA’s exclusion rules. All Pirala traders interviewed identified 
trading as a reliable source of income that is directly linked to mining: “Since my business 
started four months ago, life has been better. People migrating here have brought 
development and improved the local economy. These people will come to my shop every day, 
I will always have some cash available” (Grocery shop owner, Pirala).  
 
Pirala has several small grocery shops, taverns, a butchers, a drug store and a pool table 
house. Structures are basic and temporary, with mud walls and thatched or corrugated iron 
roofs. Shop owners procure supplies from local farm cooperatives and urban centres. Whilst 
Pirala is a convenient trading centre, lack of public transport is a challenge for traders who 
must hire private vehicles to transport goods into the NRERA.  
 
Traders boast a continual income, making an average monthly profit of 300,000 Kwacha 
(US$60.00), allowing traders to acquire bicycles, livestock and poultry. Trading off the back 
of the informal mining community’s activities provides migrants with a means of venturing 
into new businesses or investing in existing livelihood activities such as farming outside of 
the NRERA, where the dominion of local chiefs allows them to acquire and invest in land. 
Pirala’s economy is managed by a market committee of migrant traders who regulate 
community activities and collect rent. The committee also runs a neighbourhood watch 
group, advocating disciplinary measures against violent misconduct, theft, prostitution and 
even infidelity.  
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Unlike other mining zones where a gradual development of a commercial form of migration 
has seen traders settling more permanently in and around a growing informal economic base 
(Nyame et al. 2009), this was not possible in Kafubu. All activities in Pirala, from illegal 
mining to selling groceries, fall beneath the umbrella status of informal activities by nature of 
their location within the NRERA. Restrictions on establishing Pirala as a permanent 
settlement result in a lack of infrastructure, non-existent health facilities and prohibitively 
expensive transport links.  
Risks in the informal sector 
Illegal mining carries a number of physical risks including back strain from carrying large 
bags of excavated material, threats of guard dog attacks, and capture and detention by 
security personnel. The use of crude mining methods for those practicing ASM presents its 
own dangers, especially during the rainy seasons when soil collapses are frequent. 
 
The ancillary activity of charcoal production carries significant environmental consequences 
for the Kafubu area, with much of the land outside the active mine concessions being 
considerably deforested, despite the restrictions on land use. A recent study on the impacts of 
charcoal production on the type of Miombo forest found in Kafubu identifies deforestation in 
the direct vicinity of poorly managed kiln sites, higher rain runoff, increased flooding in the 
rainy season and drought in the dry season. Such environmental impacts lead in turn to a 
reduced local supply of timber, fuel, non-timber forest products, meat, honey and fruits for 
local communities (Chidumayo and Gumbo 2013). We made similar findings. Increased 
activity in Kafubu has increased pressure on the environment: trees are felled at high rates for 
charcoal burning, forests are cleared for mining and construction with few afforestation 
activities to compensate; an increase in human population and an emerging discourse on 
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‘conservation’ by NGOs aiming to counteract the negative impact of mining means wild 
animals and birds are less accessible for subsistence, and rapid land and water degradation 
around formal and informal mining sites is reducing opportunities for farming and food 
security (cf. Buxton 2013; Hinton et al 2003). These environmental impacts greatly reduce 
resource availability and threaten livelihood security and sustainability for both migrants and 
locals.  
 
A number of social risks further threaten migrant livelihood security. Many migrants 
indicated that they set out specific goals at the onset of their arrival in Kafubu, namely to 
raise funds to educate their children and to buy property back home. The timeframe for 
meeting these goals was between six months and two years. However, no individual 
interviewed had attained their ambitions. Some had been performing illegal mining/charcoal 
burning, in Kafubu for over 10 years and were still waiting to ‘hit the jackpot’. Traders from 
Pirala suggested the illegal mining of emeralds in particular is addictive, despite earning 
incrementally from small finds, individuals described a ‘craving’ for more. A 62-year old 
illegal miner, for example, stated that: “illegal mining is hard work and a gamble but it is 
worth it. It is also addictive. I have been doing it for the last six years and the most amount of 
money I have made from it is 5 million Kwacha [approx. US$ 680]. My life has not changed 
for the better because I have too many children to look after”. 
This ongoing isolation from the security provided by kin networks at home is accentuated by 
local-level isolation, which largely derives from the social stigma of being classed as an 
illegal – a term extending from its original designation of trespassers on commercial mines to 
describe the wider migrant population living informally within the NRERA.  
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This wider societal stigma depicts illegals as living in a world rife with drug abuse, 
criminality, violence, prostitution and general anarchy (c.f. Walsh 2003) and they are often 
branded by policymakers and the international donor community as misguided individuals, 
lured by the desire to rapidly accumulate wealth (Barry 1996; Slater 1994; World Bank 2005) 
or as ex-offenders who have escaped from prison and found refuge around mining zones. The 
derogatory narrative is crude and broad, obscuring not only the complex decisions that lead 
people to undertake these activities, but also the implications of these activities for wellbeing 
and livelihood security (Hilson 2010).10  
Migrants are thus considered distinct from the ‘legitimate’ livelihood activities that locals 
engage in and excluded from the CSR activities designed by companies to invest in ‘affected’ 
populations. For example, illegal miners stated that NGOs and companies do not engage with 
them when conducting activities such as land restoration through afforestation. Instead, they 
are identified as the ones responsible for destructive activities. In one focus group discussion 
with migrants, participants asserted that no one has ever asked them their challenges and 
offered opportunities for improving their livelihoods: “We are poor, have no representative 
to voice our concerns; we have less power” (Migrant living in the NRERA woodland). 
Because CSR activities do not engage with the migrants occupying the substantial informal 
sector, they have particularly poor livelihood security. The significance of this critical 
omission is the focus of our discussion below.  
Discussion: ‘sustainable mining’  
Livelihood security is determined by a number of factors, including access to and availability 
of certain assets, infrastructure, and the opportunity to pursue economic activities (Carney 
1998; Ellis 2000), as well as strong social support networks (Gilberthorpe and Banks 2012). 
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A recent study in Ghana showed that informal mining can enhance financial security and 
livelihoods through the successful accumulation and investment of savings from ASM returns 
into household assets to support other livelihoods and child education (Hilson and Garforth 
2012; see also Cartier, 2009; Fisher, Mwaipopo, Mutagwaba, Nyange and Yaron 2009; 
Hilson and McQuilken 2014). These kinds of investments and types of livelihood 
diversification are limited in Zambia’s emerald mines because of the restricted status of the 
emerald fields and the increased pressure on limited natural resources, environmental 
degradation from various forms of mining, and poor employment opportunities due to low 
levels of education.  
 
Whilst in the formal sector, livelihood security is challenged by the high risks of redundancy 
and dismissal that migrants face, it is the informal sector that presents the biggest challenge to 
migrant livelihoods. Small business enterprises are restricted by inadequate mobility and 
infrastructure, and ASM provides little guarantee of an income. In addition, unstable mineral 
prices and exploitative trade deals in illegal markets provide a highly sporadic income in the 
informal mining sector (Buxton 2013; Fisher et al. 2009;Yelpaalaa and Ali 2005). As a result, 
opportunities for investment or supporting family members can be limited (Cartier 2009), 
particularly in terms of food security (Buxton 2013).  
 
The relationship between informal mining and charcoal burning can further be framed as a 
livelihood security issue: when migrants discover that informal mining activities yield 
unreliable returns, they turn to charcoal production as an alternative informal activity. Whilst 
charcoal burning ensures an income it is poorly regulated and requires individuals to operate 
outside a legal framework, limiting the levels of security and support. Growing concerns 
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amongst locals over the environmental impacts of increased activity in Kafubu, including the 
high level of tree felling, forest clearing and land and water degradation, further limit migrant 
livelihood security by isolating them from local networks of social, economic and political 
support. For example, local respondents stated that mining activities attract migrants who 
engage in unsustainable activities such as charcoal burning. This perception of migrants as 
‘adding to’ the degeneration already accelerated by mining activities amplifies the hostility 
felt towards this sector of the community. In addition, illegal mining is associated with anti-
social behaviour such as theft, ‘idleness’ and prostitution, the latter being a great concern for 
many locals who fear an HIV/AIDs epidemic. These difficulties were all recounted by 
migrants as characteristics of their life as a Kafubu migrant.  
 
Commercial mines’ initiatives to contribute to the development of the surrounding economy 
go some way towards mitigating the concerns of local villages, providing funding and 
technical expertise in infrastructure and providing vital help in supporting health and 
education facilities. But this problematises, rather than addresses and embraces, the informal 
economy that companies unwittingly attract, or the critical role it plays in local 
socioeconomic dynamics. The livelihood activities of the predominately migrant population 
that inhabit this informal sector have important repercussions in local social, economic and 
environmental spheres. Thus, to meaningfully contribute to local development, companies 
must not only communicate with local villages but also engage with this informal economy. 
Failure to do so denotes a narrow perspective of sustainability, CSR and mine impacts. 
Below we present a number of lessons that might be taken from this study and applied to this 
and other mining zones to improve this type of development engagement and the way CSR is 
actioned.  
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Lessons Learned  
We argue that solutions to the above problems will require improved communication and 
cooperation by multiple actors at multiple levels to produce political goodwill, corporate 
commitment and strong leadership from local chiefs and village headmen. Recommendations 
in the two key sectors of the population in and around the NRERA are:   
Locals   
Improved corporate engagement with the needs and institutions of local inhabitants around 
mining zones is crucial. Lessons from Gemfields and Grizzly’s operations in Kafubu 
highlight two approaches to achieving this: 
 
1) Institutions: Corporate development programmes would benefit from operating 
through existing institutions, such as chiefs and other forms of village leadership, to 
maximise local engagement with their contributions. As mining investors have signed 
land use contracts with government bodies, the approval of local chiefs is frequently 
not considered as crucial. This has reduced chiefs’ traditional role as influential 
stakeholders in land distribution matters, weakening their power. One Kagem mine 
employee stated that the chiefs are ‘reduced to begging the companies for support and 
have to accept what they get’. Corporate relations with neighbouring communities 
would benefit from the inclusion of chiefs in company decision-making processes. 
Grizzly include one Lufwanyama chief on their board, inviting him to identify key 
areas of development when making decisions concerning both official villages outside 
of the emerald field and the informal settlement of Pirala. The Lufwanyama District 
Commissioner referred us to a quid quo pro approach to local appointments that has 
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been trialled in Livingstone, Southern Zambia. In this case a chief is a member of a 
corporate board in exchange for the nomination of a company director as a village 
headmen. While initially facing scepticism from community members, these director-
headmen have become far more connected to and aware of local development and 
employment needs than their colleagues back at the office. 
 
2) Engagement: Grizzly and Gemfields both engage with local communities to an 
extent. The farming cooperatives supported by Gemfields, for example, are an attempt 
to help local communities become self-sustaining; but this could be extended in both 
scope and quality. In addition, both companies contribute to the cost of ceremonies 
and chief visits and have donated vehicles to the district commissioner and chiefs, 
whilst Gemfields funded building improvements to both chiefs’ palaces. However, 
material gifts have made the chiefs appear greedy, stoking community resentment 
towards their leaders. Material gifts can be ineffective if they are not made sensitively 
along traditional lines and are not enough to qualify companies as making a 
meaningful contribution to local development in the eyes of the population. 
Companies must think beyond short-term material benefits by facilitating activities 
that can be sustained over a long period of time.  
 
3) Infrastructure: Community expectations of development by mining companies are 
very high. As such, contributions by companies to local infrastructure and services are 
crucial to development around the NRERA. Fifty percent of our respondents said that 
they expect the mining companies to, inter alia, improve road networks, provide 
transport links, provide more learning resources in primary schools, build secondary 
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schools and provide electricity to households. Although several informants 
acknowledged the CSR efforts already made by companies in local schooling, they 
stated that they expect the industries to offer solid commitments in terms of 
transparency and accountability in order to promise long-term investments in local 
development. Some respondents from around Kafubu voiced frustration with how the 
level of actual development fails to match their expectations of shared wealth from 
Kafubu’s emerald resources: 
 
“They [mining companies] are potentially very important, but they have 
done very little for the communities. They could improve roads and 
transport. Communities would like them to participate and contribute to 
functions in villages – like traditional ceremonies” (District 
Commissioner, Lufwanyama District, September 2012)  
 
“Having an idea about production level of the mining companies would 
help the community to decide what kind of support they could ask for” 
(Councillor, Pirala village, September 2012).  
 
“These mining companies make a lot of money but they do very little to 
the local economy” (Local Farmer, Kapila Village, September 2012).  
 
If the above initiatives are achieved through local consultation and engagement, considering 
the requirements of both locals and migrants, they hold the potential to reduce dependency on 
the resources provided by the mining companies and will go some way towards fulfilling a 
sustainable mining narrative.  
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Migrants  
Active engagement with the informal economy populated by migrants, is essential to 
providing secure livelihoods, encouraging sustainable levels of natural resource use and 
mitigating conflict with companies. This could be achieved in a number of ways: 
 
1. Tenure: Securing rights to land use for migrants on a long-term basis is relatively 
straightforward in the villages just outside the NRERA. Chiefs in Lufwanyama 
allocate parcels of land freely to new arrivals in Lufwanyama in return for a gift as a 
demonstration of respect (‘Lambas are generous with their land’ (Police Assistant 
Superintendent, September 2012)). This approach has successfully mitigated conflict 
between locals and migrants around Kafubu and provided a level of localised 
livelihood security for migrants. However, within the NRERA tenure rights remain a 
challenge to be addressed.  
 
2. Security: A more liberal approach to security on land concessions outside core 
mining areas would contribute to a greater sense of livelihood stability for those living 
within the NRERA. This migrant population need to be recognised by companies, 
who could go beyond stringent security measures to engage with the informal 
economy. Gemfields’ security measures have long been coupled with an 
unwillingness to engage with the realities of the population living around their mining 
site. Grizzly has engaged with this sector of the population by permitting the 
establishment of the Pirala settlement and trading hub on their concession, as well as 
setting up a school within the NRERA. These provisions allow alternative businesses 
to grow, and provide relatively secure tenure, without the constant threat of eviction. 
Formalising this settlement would increase investment in longer term goals and 
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provide greater security and opportunities for its residents. Informally, chiefs have 
dominion over Pirala. If formalised, community activities would be easier to regulate 
– from informal mining to charcoal burning. Chidumayo and Gumbo (2013), for 
example, argue that secure and strongly defined land ownership is a key management 
policy that would provide the basis for more sustainable charcoal production methods 
in Zambia. 
 
3. Engagement: Charcoal burning is identified as at once a primary source of energy 
across Kafubu and a significant source of environmental destruction. Thus, better 
engagement with actors involved in this activity is critical. Currently, migrants living 
within the NRERA cannot obtain title deeds. As such, charcoal burners are not legally 
entitled to obtain licences. The wider provision of electricity would also contribute to 
reducing the negative environmental effects of charcoal burning, although this would 
need to be mediated with alternative livelihood sources such as conservation projects. 
We found that migrants are ready and willing to engage in conservation activities in 
return for formal recognition. This could be achieved through concessions to land use 
within the NRERA. 
 
4. Public-Private Partnerships: The opportunities for public-private partnership 
engagements should be embraced. In addition to the relatively piecemeal projects the 
companies fund (e.g. a farmer cooperative, building a few classrooms, funding a 
cultural event etc.) a more transparent short-to-medium-term strategy that clearly 
outlines specific projects and funding initiatives that will benefit the total population 
on a sustainable level would be welcomed. For example, the mining company may 
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not necessarily give direct support to illegals, but they can support the government in 
designing and implementing programmes that can help minimise detrimental 
activities by building capacity in relevant government departments (e.g. the 
environment) and enforcing strict laws (e.g. on charcoal burning). Realistically the 
companies cannot replace the state, but they can work together through these 
partnerships and capacity building initiatives to construct a more sustainable 
framework around engagement.  
 
Gemfields have recently taken important steps towards engaging with the informal mining 
sector. In April 2015, they opened a buying office in the nearby town of Kitwe that will 
purchase stones back from the informal sector, a market currently dominated by the Go-
Come cartels and their buyers. The centre could, according to Gemfields’ executives, 
‘eventually provide the company with the equivalent of as much as 25 percent to 30 percent 
of production from its nearby Kagem mine’. Gemfields states that: ‘Small-scale emerald 
miners and traders will get “far higher prices” at the centre for their gems than from other 
buyers (…). Many of Zambia’s emeralds end up on the illegal market and are smuggled out 
of the country, selling for less than a tenth of the price Gemfields may achieve in auction. 
The office will help boost Zambia’s tax revenue by capturing more of the trade’ (Bloomberg 
Business 2015). This private sector initiative may not be representative of ‘sustainable 
mining’ per se, but this type of engagement with the informal sector demonstrates a way in 
which the mining industry might work with rather than against the actors mining attracts in 
their CSR efforts. The effects of this engagement warrants further research to identify its 
immediate and long-term outcomes for migrant livelihoods. 
 
29 
 
Conclusions 
There is little doubt that the mining industry can contribute to improved livelihood security in 
the areas they operate. The level to which this contributes to ‘sustainability’ we argue, 
depends on a number of factors, many of which are still overlooked in the industry’s 
engagement strategy. This study has shown that the pursuit of sustainable mining is more 
complex and challenging than a commitment to CSR entails because it involves 
understanding and meeting the needs and expectations of many different stakeholders. 
Emerald mining in Kafubu has important livelihood benefits through the provision of formal 
employment and improvement of social services such as health and education. But numerous 
benefits are derived from the substantial informal economy that has mushroomed around 
mining, ranging from activities in ASM to more audacious forms of extracting Kafubu’s 
mineral wealth, as well as a host of business ventures and exploitation of the area’s other 
natural resource reserves, notably its forests for charcoal production. This informal economy 
is largely populated by migrants, having initially travelled to Kafubu in the hope of finding a 
job with commercial mines. Our findings suggest that livelihood security for mining 
migrants, and sustainable development more broadly, remains restricted by poor engagement 
with this sector.   
 
This nuanced approach to ‘sustainable mining’ makes an important contribution to the 
literature. We move beyond a consideration of impacts (positive and negative) to argue that it 
is the multitude of actors themselves that determine whether and how mining might be 
‘sustainable’ not the CSR initiatives designed and implemented within a corporate space. In 
the face of weak government regulation and enforcement, and poor engagement with mining 
populations, the role of the corporate sector is magnified in mining zones like Kafubu. As 
30 
 
such, we argue, corporations cannot be reductive in their approach to CSR. They must engage 
with the actors determining the narrative within the landscape of extraction.  
 
We provide recommendations on how CSR initiatives can not only improve corporate 
investments in infrastructure and services, but also engage with the informal sector to support 
livelihood security for locals and migrants alike. This would begin with recognition of the 
importance of the informal sector in generating significant sources of income and 
determining the dynamics of local resource use and availability. Promising initiatives to build 
on this resolve are emerging, as Grizzly has demonstrated with the establishment of Pirala 
School, and Gemfields by exploring options to ‘informally’ acquire emeralds. However, 
mining companies need to engage on a far more expansive and inclusive scale with both the 
formal and informal activities surrounding their operations before claims of delivering 
‘sustainable mining’ and ‘responsibly sourced’ gemstones are fully achieved. 
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1 ‘Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs.’ (WCED 1987: 43) 
2 According to the report of the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Project (MMSD, 2002) ‘One of 
the greatest challenges facing the world today is integrating economic activity with environmental integrity, 
social concerns, and effective governance systems. The goal of that integration can be seen as 'sustainable 
development.' In the context of the minerals sector, the goal should be to maximize the contribution to the well-
being of the current generation in a way that ensures an equitable distribution of its costs and benefits, without 
reducing the potential for future generations to meet their own needs.’ 
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3 Other mines were opening during the time of our fieldwork including a new Chinese-run emerald mine. For 
the sustainable development initiatives developed by the two companies present in our study see Grizzly 2015 
and Gemfields 2015. 
4 Livelihood security is taken to mean the adequate and sustainable access to income and resources to meet basic 
needs, including suitable access to food, potable water, health facilities, educational opportunities, housing, and 
time for community participation and social integration (see Frankenberger and McCaston 1996). 
5 We are limited by space to discuss issues of conflict, but it is important to note that conflict is currently very 
low in Kafubu. We found the role of the chiefs to be paramount in the mitigation of conflict.  
6 We define ‘locals’ as individuals with kinship or ancestral ties within the area, and ‘migrants’ as individuals 
with ties to areas outside of Lufwanyama District. 
7 Prior to this, emeralds were widely used by the traditional land users Informant statements suggest emeralds 
were easy to collect because they were near the surface. Both males and females possessed emeralds; they were 
used as ornaments and for games (e.g. ‘drafts’). Anecdotal accounts also suggest that people were buried with 
emeralds (Gilberthorpe, Agol and Gegg 2012). 
8 See company websites for detail: http://consumer.gemfields.co.uk/ ; 
http://www.grizzlymining.co.zm/index.php/en/corporate-social-responsibility 
9 For discussion of how informal markets can provide opportunities for diversifying away from mineral 
extraction, see Banchirigah 2008; Hilson and Garforth 2012; Nyame et al 2009.  
10 Whilst in this paper we identify different categories of ‘migrant’ that are treated differently by locals, 
corporates, NGOs and government bodies, there is an interesting body of work on the perception of migrants as 
‘strangers’ in mining zones that renders them external to the local community. See in particular Akiwumi 2014 
and Njoh 2009. 
